Shielding intentions from distraction: Forming an intention induces inhibition of distracting stimuli by Veling, H.P. & Knippenberg, A.F.M. van






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
VELING AND VAN KNIPPENBERGINTE TIO –INDUCED INHIBITION
SHIELDING INTENTIONS FROM DISTRACTION:
FORMING AN INTENTION INDUCES
INHIBITION OF DISTRACTING STIMULI
Harm Veling and Ad van Knippenberg
Radboud University Nijmegen
Previous research has shown that focal goals are shielded through inhibi-
tion of alternative goals. The present research aims to extend these findings
and show that execution of experimentally induced intentions is also
shielded from distraction. In two experiments participants were instructed
to form an intention to react to specific stimuli (intention cues). Next, we
assessed accessibility of the intention cues, distracting cues and control
cues. Results show that distracting cues were inhibited compared with
control cues. In addition, we obtained preliminary evidence that this inhi-
bition facilitates execution of previously formed intentions. The present re-
search adds to earlier research on intentions and goal shielding by showing
that cognitive self–regulatory processes shield intentions from distraction.
Fending off distractions to shield execution and completion of in-
tentions is indispensable for successful goal pursuit. Preparing a
lecture, reading an article or writing a paper all depend, at least
partly, on the ability to not get distracted too often. Unfortu-
nately, however, there are usually many environmental cues that
might interfere with the processing of intention–related behavior
and hence hinder the proper implementation of our intentions:
Receiving an e–mail at work from a friend may trigger a memory
representation of a party that temporarily interferes with prepar-
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ing the lecture, reading the article or writing the paper. Neverthe-
less, in many cases we appear to be able to cope with distraction
and reach our intended goals. Apparently, self–regulatory pro-
cesses can overcome or shield ongoing intentions from these dis-
tractions. The present article is concerned with the question of
how we execute appropriate behavior in response to suitable
environmental cues without interference from distracting cues.
Goal–directed behavior is in large part determined by environ-
mental cues (see Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). These
cues may guide behavior either directly or may be mediated by
internal representations (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Gollwitzer &
Moskowitz, 1996). Indeed, a growing area of research is showing
that goal–related cues can activate goals, goal–directed informa-
tion processing and goal–directed behavior even without aware-
ness of these cues (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Chai, Barndollar, &
Troetschel, 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Moskowitz,
Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). For instance, Bargh et al.
showed that priming participants with an achievement goal in-
creased performance on an intellectual task compared with per-
formance in a control condition. Because environmental cues play
such a major role in goal–directed behavior, regulation of accessi-
bility of these cues seems crucial for successful goal attainment.
Once a goal is chosen, it is important to shield this goal from inter-
ference of distracting stimuli. Presumably then, goal attainment
is facilitated by inhibition of interfering stimuli such as alterna-
tive goals, temptations or distracting environmental cues
(Kruglanski et al., 2002; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996).
Consistent with this reasoning, recent research on goal shield-
ing has shown that activation of a focal goal causes inhibition of
alternative goals (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002). More
specifically, Shah et al. showed that activation of a self–relevant
goal to which participants are committed causes inhibition of al-
ternative goals that could interfere with attainment of the self–rel-
evant goal. Thus, at the level of goal representations it is clear that
activation of a desired goal causes inhibition of interfering goals.
However, the process of goal striving does not end with activa-
tion of an (abstract) focal goal. Successful goal pursuit also relies
on self–regulatory skills in initiating, executing and completing
goals (Gollwitzer, 1999; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996).
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So, after goal selection, planning of goal attainment becomes
imperative (e.g., Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Gollwitzer,
1990, 1996). During this implementation phase of goal pursuit
more concrete goals are needed that deal with fulfillment of the
how, where and when of goal pursuit (e.g., Heckhausen &
Gollwitzer, 1987; Gollwitzer, 1996). We will refer to such concrete
goals as intentions (see Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, &
Henrike, in press). More specifically, Kuhl (1987) defines an in-
tention as “an activated plan to which an actor committed herself
or himself” (p. 282). Thus, intentions specify behaviors required
for goal completion and hence differ from goals in that they are
more concrete. In addition, as compared to goals, intentions are
highly variable, because most goals can be achieved in numerous
ways. Just as abstract goals, however, intentions require shielding
from distraction in order to complete them (Gollwitzer, 1999).
How can we accomplish this shielding of intentions?
On the level of goal representations, Shah, Friedman, and
Kruglanski (2002) have argued that inhibition of distracting goals
is learned: After repeatedly inhibiting a distracting goal in setting
of a focal goal, mere activation of the focal goal inhibits the dis-
tracting goal. Such learning of inhibitory relations is possible be-
cause, at some level of abstraction (e.g., shopping, studying,
partying, sporting), at a particular point in time, there may not
exist so many competing goals.
However, a similar process seems unlikely for inhibition of dis-
tracting cues in the case of shielding intentions. As described
above, goal implementation through the formulation of concrete
intentions can be very variable. Additionally, distractions that
might interfere with an intention are also highly variable. These
distractions may include other intentions, distracting memory
representations, and virtually any interesting salient environ-
mental stimulus. Consequently, it seems virtually inconceivable
that one could learn an inhibitory relation between every inten-
tion and every distracting stimulus. The scope of possible rela-
tions between feasible intentions and possible distractions when
implementing attainment of a focal goal seems too wide and di-
verse to ever be learned. Postulation of a flexible mechanism that
targets all kinds of interference seems necessary to explain how
intentions are shielded from distraction.
INTENTION–INDUCED INHIBITION 411
We argue that the degree of interference of a stimulus predicts
the level of inhibition this interfering stimulus is subjected to. If a
stimulus does not interfere with an ongoing intention there is no
need to inhibit it. However, if a stimulus does interfere with an
ongoing intention, shielding from this stimulus becomes neces-
sary for successful intention completion. A comparable process
has already been revealed in research on the retrieval of informa-
tion from long–term memory. In particular, research on re-
trieval–induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994) has
shown that retrieval of a specific memory representation from
long–term memory can cause forgetting (e.g., Anderson, Bjork, &
Bjork, 1994; Macrae & MacLeod, 1999) and inhibition (Anderson
& Spellman, 1995; Veling & van Knippenberg, 2004) of related
memory representations. The explanation for this paradoxical ef-
fect is that during retrieval of a specific memory representation,
other related memory representations also become activated. As
these related representations may interfere with retrieval of the
intended memory representation, inhibitory processes suppress
the related interfering representations, thereby facilitating selec-
tion of the target memory representation (Anderson & Spellman,
1995; a similar process has also been shown on a neurological
level in the context of intentional forgetting by Anderson et al.
[2004]).
It may be argued that retrieval is just a special case that recruits
executive control processes to override pre–potent responses (in
this case, override retrieval of interfering memories; Anderson,
2003). The inhibitory mechanisms that cause inhibition of inter-
fering memory representations are not limited to retrieval pro-
cesses but, as Anderson (2003) stated, “are essential to our ability
to behave in a flexible, context–appropriate manner” (p. 442).
Consistent with this reasoning we argue that intentions recruit in-
hibitory processes to deal with interfering (and thus distracting)
stimuli. Furthermore, we think that this inhibition of interference
can occur spontaneously, that is, once an intention is active
interference will be inhibited without an instruction to do so.
To test this idea we asked participants to form an intention and
subsequently we measured the accessibility of interfering and
control cues. In the present research we manipulated the degree
of interference by varying strength of semantic associations be-
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tween intention relevant cues with other environmental cues. The
idea is that stronger associates interfere more and therefore re-
quire inhibition (see Anderson & Spellman, 1995). We presented
participants with exemplars from two semantic categories (fruits
and animals). Next, we asked participants to form an intention to
respond to a selection of exemplars of one of the categories (e.g.,
peach, melon and strawberry). After that, we measured the acces-
sibility of cues from the same semantic category as the intentional
cues (e.g., grape, plum and orange—the distracting cues) and
cues from an unrelated semantic category (e.g., elephant, rabbit
and lion; i.e., the control cues) during an intention execution task.
Our hypothesis is that cues that are semantically related to the in-
tentional cues are more likely to interfere with the content of the
intention and hence require more inhibition compared with cues
from an unrelated semantic category. We tested this hypothesis in
two experiments.
THE PRESENT PARADIGM
In both experiments participants first memorized exemplars of
two categories (e.g., fruit–peach, fruit–grape, animal–lion, ani-
mal–elephant). This phase was included to activate all stimuli in
memory. In the second phase participants received a modified
lexical decision task. Participants were instructed to do a lexical
decision task and in addition to form an intention to press the
space bar after each lexical decision concerning a subset of exem-
plars from one of the categories. Pressing a designated key in re-
sponse to a specific cue has been used previously to
operationalize intentions (e.g., Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2005). This
manipulation generated three types of cues: exemplars that re-
quire a space bar response after the lexical decision (intention
cues, for example peach), exemplars from the same semantic cate-
gory as the intention cues that do not require a space bar response
(distracting cues, for example, grape), and exemplars from an un-
related category that do not require a space bar response (control
cues, for example, lion). Note that the instruction in the first phase
to memorize all the exemplars enhanced the probability that the
distracting cues would require inhibition during this lexical deci-
sion task. By means of lexical decision latencies to the different
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cues we assessed the accessibility of all memorized exemplars.
We hypothesize slower lexical decision latencies to distracting
cues compared with lexical decision latencies to control cues.
Moreover, we explored whether this inhibition facilitates the
execution of the intentions (space bar presses).
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Participants. Seventy–three undergraduate students from the
Radboud University Nijmegen participated in Experiment 1 in
exchange for €2 (approximately $2.60).
Materials. Two categories (fruit and animals) each comprising
six exemplars were constructed for Experiment 1. These cate-
gory–exemplar pairs were selected from a study on category
norms in which Dutch category–exemplar pairs were generated
(Storms, 2001).1 The exemplars of each category were matched for
category typicality and word length. To ensure that every exem-
plar would function as an intention cue, distracting cue or control
cue, four sets were constructed in which the function of exem-
plars varied between participants. Three exemplars of one cate-
gory served as intention cues within each set, leaving the other
three exemplars from this selected category as distracting cues.
The exemplars from the other category served as control cues.
Two types of fillers were used in the lexical decision task. First,
five words were included that did not belong to any of the catego-
ries. These words were presented within the first ten trials in or-
der to familiarize the participants with the lexical decision task. In
addition we used 53 non–words as fillers to ensure that the proba-
bility of a word response equaled the probability of a non–word
response. These were 53 pronounceable letter strings, which were
not part of the Dutch vocabulary. All fillers were matched to the
length of the experimental cues.
Procedure. In the present experiments participants read
self–paced through the instructions. The first instructions screen
informed the participants that the experiment consisted of three
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1. All stimuli can be obtained from Harm Veling.
phases. In the first phase, participants were asked to study word
pairs from two categories: fruits and animals. Participants were
informed that they would be asked to retrieve those word pairs in
the final phase of the experiment. Category exemplar pairs were
then presented one by one for 5 sec with a 1 sec interval between
presentations. The categories were presented in capitals and were
separated by a dash from the exemplars, which were presented in
lower case letters (e.g., FRUIT – mango). The category–exemplar
pairs of each category were presented as a block. The order of
these blocks and the presentation of the exemplars within each
block were randomized.
The second phase of the experiment was presented as a study
on memorizing intentions. First, participants received instruc-
tions for the lexical decision task. They were instructed to indicate
as fast and as accurately as possible whether letter strings, pre-
sented in the middle of the computer screen, were words. Partici-
pants were instructed to press the left button (the F) when a
non–word was presented and the right button (the K) when a
word was presented, on a QWERTY keyboard. An asterisk that
was presented for 1.5 to 2 sec indicated the spot where letter
strings would appear. Following a participant’s response a back-
ward mask (XXXXXX) replaced the letter string. This mask
remained on the screen for 1.5 sec.
Subsequently, participants read that they were required to
press the space bar after lexical decisions concerning three specific
words from one of the categories presented in the first phase of
the experiment. This space bar response could be executed during
the presentation of the backward mask. The instruction was: After
your lexical decision concerning peach, melon and mango we need you to
press the space bar (the presented intention cues depended on the
stimulus set participants received). Moreover, to ensure fast and
accurate responses, we promised to reward the fastest, most accu-
rate participant with a book token of 10. After this instruction
participants read a summary of all instructions, which empha-
sized that the occasional space bar response should occur after the
lexical decision. Furthermore, participants read that they should
use a thumb of their hand of choice to press the space bar. They
were asked to keep their index fingers on the F and K buttons and
their thumbs on the space bar during the reaction time task. After
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reading these instructions they could press a button to start the
reaction time task.
The reaction time task consisted of 106 trials. All intention cues
and all distracting cues were presented four times each (24 trials
in total) and the control cues were presented twice (24 trials in to-
tal). Thus, the reaction time task consisted of 106 trials (12 inten-
tion cues, 12 distracting cues, 24 control cues, 5 filler words and 53
filler non–words). Two orders of trial presentation were con-
structed (control cue, non–word, intention cue, etc). Within these
orders the stimuli were randomly selected and one of these orders
was randomly selected between participants.
The reaction time task was followed by a free recall task in
which participants were cued with the category labels and were
asked to write down as many of the exemplars from the first
phase of the experiment as possible. Note that this free recall task
was merely inserted as a follow up to the memorize instructions
given earlier in the experiment.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Two participants were excluded from the following analyses be-
cause they pressed the space bar on every trial, leaving 71 partici-
pants for analyses. In Experiments 1 and 2 we used several data
transformations to deal with outliers (i.e., a cut–off criterion of 2 s,
a cut–off–criterion of 3 s or removal of response latencies beyond
3 SDs from the mean). The following analyses are reliable in all
these transformations. The reported analyses and means are
based on the 3 s cut–off criterion (retaining 99.7 % of the data dis-
tribution in both experiments). Furthermore, we excluded trials
in which lexical decisions were incorrect (2.3%) and trials in
which participants made an erroneous space bar response (1.8 %).
To test whether intentions caused inhibition of distracting cues
we performed a single factor (cue type: intention, distracting, con-
trol) within–subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the lexical
decision latencies. As expected, the main effect of cue type was re-
liable, F(2, 140) = 4.41, p < .05. Simple effect tests revealed that this
effect was caused by increased reaction times to the distracting
cues (M = 698 ms, SD = 178) compared with both the intention
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cues (M = 672 ms, SD = 165) and control cues (M = 668 ms, SD =
113), respective comparisons F(1,70) = 10.53, p < .05, d = .15, and
F(1,70) = 5.42, p < .05, d = .20. There was no reliable difference be-
tween the intention and control cues, F(1, 70) < 1, ns. The increased
lexical decision latencies to the distracting cues demonstrate that
cues that interfere with an intention are indeed inhibited. As such,
these results are consistent with the idea that distracting stimuli
are inhibited to shield the implementation of intentions.
Next, we assessed whether this inhibition of distracting cues
was helpful in executing the space bar response after lexical deci-
sions to intention cues. To examine this functionality of the ob-
served inhibition of distraction, we computed a correlation
between the strength of inhibition (calculated as the difference be-
tween lexical decision latencies to distracting cues and lexical de-
cision latencies to control cues) and goal directed behavior
(latencies of space bar presses), partialling out the mean lexical
decision latencies on all trials (to control for individual differ-
ences in reaction times). This analysis yielded a reliable negative
partial correlation between these two variables, pr(68) = –.28, p <
.05. This correlation indicates that stronger inhibition of distrac-
tion is related to faster space bar pressing. Thus, it appears that in-
tentional behavior (space bar presses) is facilitated if distracting
cues are inhibited more strongly. This partial correlation corrobo-
rates a functional account of the inhibition of distracting cues, by
showing that protecting the content of intentions, through
inhibition of distraction, facilitates execution of these intentions.
At first sight it may seem remarkable that accessibility of inten-
tion cues was not facilitated compared with accessibility of con-
trol cues. Indeed, studies in the domain of implementation
intentions, for instance, have reported increased accessibility of
intention relevant cues (e.g., Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999;
for a review see Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2004). However, the pat-
tern of the present results is consistent with prior research (Veling
& van Knippenberg, 2004, Experiment 2) that also reported inhi-
bition of distracting cues, but no facilitation in lexical decision la-
tencies of cues with a special status (in that case repeatedly
retrieved cues). Presumably, explicitly memorizing cues pro-
duces asymptotic levels of accessibility of both intention and con-
trol cues which leads to ceiling effects concerning these cues in the
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subsequent lexical decision task. As a result, the lexical decision
task only reveals inhibition of distracting cues. Similarly, forming
an intention may not necessarily enhance accessibility of inten-
tion cues compared with (also presented) control cues. Conse-
quently, the absence of facilitation of intention cues in
Experiment 1 should not be interpreted as intention cues having
no special status (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2004; see also Goschke &
Kuhl, 1993), but should be attributed to the nature of the
dependent measure in combination with memorized words.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2 we aimed to replicate the findings of Experiment
1. Moreover, because in everyday life distractions are unexpected
and maybe infrequent, we examined whether the inhibition of
distracting cues would still hold in a more complex situation. To
examine this, participants in Experiment 2 received five intention
cues that were only presented once in a total of 92 trials. So
whereas the probability of encountering an intention cue in Ex-
periment 1 was 11.3%, this probability was reduced to 5.4 % in Ex-
periment 2. In addition, a specific intention cue was presented
only once in Experiment 2 compared with four times in Experi-
ment 1. We expected the same pattern of results as we have
observed in Experiment 1.
METHOD
Participants. Fifty–five undergraduate students from the
Radboud University Nijmegen participated in Experiment 2 in
exchange for €2 (approximately $2.60).
Materials. Two categories (fruit and animals) each comprising
ten exemplars were constructed for Experiment 2. These exem-
plars were again selected from the sample from Storms (2001) and
the categories were matched following the same criteria as used
in Experiment 1. To ensure that every exemplar would function as
an intention, distracting or control cue, four sets were constructed
that varied the function of exemplars between participants. Five
exemplars of one category served as intention cues within each
set, leaving the other five exemplars from this selected category as
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distracting cues. The exemplars from the other category served as
control cues.
Two types of fillers were used in the lexical decision task. First,
there were 27 words that did not belong to any of the categories.
These were included to separate the experimental exemplars by
at least three trials. Second, we used 45 non–words. These were 45
pronounceable letter strings, which were not part of the Dutch vo-
cabulary. All fillers were matched to the length of the experimen-
tal exemplar words.
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 was virtually identi-
cal to that of Experiment 1. The main difference was that partici-
pants memorized 20 category exemplar pairs and that they were
instructed to form an intention to respond to five intention cues in
the second phase of the experiment (half of the exemplars from
one of the categories). The instruction read: After lexical decisions
concerning five specific words we need you to press the space bar. These
words will be presented when you press a button. These five intention
cues were simultaneously presented on the screen for 30 seconds.
In addition, the lexical decision task was modified such that each
experimental cue was presented only once. Thus, the reaction
time task consisted of 92 trials (5 intention cues, 5 distracting cues,
10 control cues, 27 filler words and 45 filler non–words).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Two participants were excluded from the analysis because they
pressed the space bar on every trial, leaving 53 participants for
analysis. To deal with outliers we used the same data transforma-
tions as in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, 2.6% of the lexical deci-
sions were incorrect and 2.8% of the space bar responses were
incorrect. These responses were again omitted from the following
analyses.
We performed a single factor (cue type: intention, distracting,
control) within–subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the
lexical decision latencies to assess whether intentions caused in-
hibition of distracting cues. As expected, the main effect of cue
type was again reliable F(2, 104) = 4.28, p < .05. Simple effect tests
revealed that this effect was due to increased reaction times to the
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distracting cues (M = 890 ms, SD = 324) compared with both the
intention cues (M = 839 ms, SD = 248) and control cues (M = 811
ms, SD = 190), respective comparisons F(1,52) = 4.40, p < .05, d =
.18 and F(1,52) = 5.66, p < .05, d = .30. There was no reliable differ-
ence between the intention and control cues, F(1,52) = 1.41, ns.
These results nicely replicate the results of Experiment 1 and indi-
cate that cues that are related to intention cues are inhibited.
To assess the functionality of the reported inhibition effect we
computed the same correlation as in Experiment 1. This partial
correlation between the strength of inhibition and reaction times
on space bar presses while controlling for individual differences
in overall reaction time speed was marginally reliable, pr(50) =
–.27, p = .055. This correlation is of the same magnitude as the cor-
relation in Experiment 1 and is an indication that successful goal
directed behavior (space bar presses) is directly related to
inhibition of distracting cues.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We conducted two experiments to examine the shielding of inten-
tions from distracting stimuli. We expected that forming an inten-
tion would cause inhibition of semantically related and thus
distracting cues compared with unrelated control cues. Both ex-
periments confirmed that instructing participants to react to spe-
cific cues (intention cues) inhibits access to cues that might
interfere with this intention (distracting cues) compared with
control cues. This pattern of results is consistent with the idea that
cognitive self–regulatory processes spontaneously shield
intentions from distraction.
We would like to emphasize that the main aim of the reported
experiments was to show inhibition of distracting cues. Nonethe-
less, we also found some preliminary support for a functional ac-
count of this inhibition effect in Experiments 1 and 2: As
inhibition of distracting cues was stronger, participants were
faster to execute their intentions. Although the correlation is
moderate, it nevertheless nicely illustrates the functionality of the
inhibition of distracting cues.
The effect sizes of the inhibition of distracting cues as indicated
by Cohen’s d are small. However, it should be noted that these in-
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hibition effects resulted from relatively subtle manipulations. In
both experiments, participants were simply instructed to press
the space bar after encountering intention cues during a lexical
decision task. Even though the intention cues were displayed
only once on the screen, lexical decisions to distracting cues were
slower compared to control cues. Accordingly, considering such
minimal inductions of intention, it is not surprising that the
effects sizes obtained are rather small.
The present results are consistent with, but also different from,
research on goal shielding by Shah et al. (2002). Just as activating a
focal goal inhibits alternative goals, forming an intention induces
inhibition of distracting stimuli. However, the explanation for in-
hibition of alternative goals offered by Shah et al., that is,
overlearned inhibition of the alternative goal in pursuit of a focal
goal, cannot explain the present results. Participants inhibit a
word like grape in pursuit of pressing the space bar to orange. Be-
cause participants have probably never been in pursuit of this
specific intention, inhibition of distraction is unlikely to be
learned. Therefore, we propose a basic mechanism that can ex-
plain inhibition of distraction concerning new intentions: Any
content that interferes with the content of an intention will receive
inhibition. Consistent with this idea we found that stimuli merely
semantically related to the content of an intention are inhibited
compared with (non–distracting) semantically unrelated stimuli.
Note, however, that the processes underlying shielding goals ver-
sus shielding intentions are not mutually exclusive, but comple-
mentary. In goal selection learned inhibitory relations inhibit
alternative goals, whereas in goal execution intentions are
shielded through inhibition of any interference. Thus, the present
results give new insight into the path from goal setting to goal
execution.
The reasoning from the previous paragraph provides an inter-
esting avenue for future research. One implication might be that if
one specific distracting stimulus keeps interfering with one spe-
cific intention, an inhibitory relation develops between this inten-
tion and the distracting stimulus. Interestingly, such a process
could explain how overlearned inhibitory relations between com-
peting goals develop, i.e., inhibitory relations originate from re-
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peated interference (Shah et al., 2002; see also Fishbach,
Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003).
Because the paradigm used in the present research is adapted
from research studying long–term memory processes, more spe-
cifically part–list cuing (e.g., Basden & Basden, 1995) and re-
trieval–induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994;
Veling & van Knippenberg, 2004), it is important to note that such
previously reported long–term memory processes cannot ac-
count for the present data.2 Part–list cuing refers to the phenome-
non that presenting participants with part of a previously studied
list impairs recall of the whole list compared with a condition in
which no part of the list is presented. Part–list cuing effects are
likely caused by a disruption of retrieval processes when part of
the list is available during retrieval of the whole list (Basden &
Basden, 1995). The key issue is that part–list cuing is not obtained
when the presentation of part of the list (in our case presentation
of intention cues) and measurement of memory for the whole list
(in our case in the lexical decision task) are separated (for a discus-
sion of these whole–part–whole experiments see Basden and
Basden, 1995). Moreover, because our main dependent variable
(lexical decision) taps accessibility rather than retrieval processes,
part–list cuing is further eliminated as an underlying process.
Thus, another process is required to account for the inhibition of
distracting cues.
In a related vein, research on retrieval–induced forgetting has
repeatedly shown that when part of a previously studied list and
the whole studied list are presented in separated phases of an ex-
periment, mere presentation of part of the list is not sufficient to
obtain any inhibition when memory for the whole list is tested
(Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 2000; Bäuml, 2002). Based on these ar-
guments we argue that our results do not merely reflect an old
long–term memory phenomenon, but are new because they show
that inhibition of part of the list (i.e., the inhibition of distracting
cues) can be found when it interferes with keeping an intention in
mind.
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2. We would like to thank Jim Uleman and an anonymous reviewer for drawing our at-
tention to this issue.
The current data have interesting implications for theorizing on
the status of intentions in memory. Previous research on this sub-
ject suggests that intentions are in a constant state of heightened
activation (the intention superiority effect; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993;
Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998). However, this previous research is
based on a comparison between two kinds of stimuli: intention
stimuli and other to be remembered stimuli. On the basis of our
research it seems arguable that the to be remembered stimuli are
inhibited to prevent them from interfering with the intention
stimuli. This could mean that intentions are either in a heightened
state of activation, or potentially interfering stimuli are in a low-
ered state of activation, or both. However, because the stimuli and
research procedures from the present experiments differ substan-
tially from these earlier experiments, it is difficult to draw conclu-
sions based on this comparison. Nevertheless, future research on
the intention superiority effect (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) may
include a control condition to reveal facilitory and inhibitory
effects independently.
The reported experiments aimed to show that intentions spon-
taneously shield the content of concrete intentions from distrac-
tion by inhibiting interfering content. We obtained repeated
evidence that intentions can indeed induce inhibition of cues that
might interfere with intention execution. Furthermore, this inhi-
bition seems functional because it is positively related to task
performance.
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